美国在阿富汗面临新挑战:如何与塔利班政府打交道

e7be8ee59bbde59ca8e998bfe5af8ce6b197e99da2e4b8b4e696b0e68c91e68898efbc9ae5a682e4bd95e4b88ee5a194e588a9e78fade694bfe5ba9ce68993e4baa4 • 美国在阿富汗面临新挑战:如何与塔利班政府打交道 塔利班

美国在阿富汗面临新挑战:如何与塔利班政府打交道

The New U.S. Challenge in Afghanistan: Coping With Taliban Rule

周二,塔利班武装分子在喀布尔机场庆祝胜利,但这种庆祝可能是短暂的。
周二,塔利班武装分子在喀布尔机场庆祝胜利,但这种庆祝可能是短暂的。 JIM HUYLEBROEK FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES
Even as the United States finalizes its departure from Afghanistan, it faces a dilemma there as wrenching as any during the 20-year war: how to deal with the new Taliban government.
即使最终从阿富汗撤离,美国仍面临着一个困境,它与20年的战争一样令人痛苦:如何与新的塔利班政府打交道。
The question is already manifest in the debate over how deeply to cooperate against a mutual enemy, the Islamic State branch in the region, known as ISIS-K.
这一问题已经体现在关于如何深入合作打击共同敌人——伊斯兰国呼罗珊分支(ISIS-K,伊斯兰国在该地区的分支)的讨论中。
Another: Whether to release $9.4 billion in Afghan government currency reserves that are frozen in the United States. Handing the Taliban billions would mean funding the machinery of its ultraconservative rule. But withholding the money would all but ensure a sudden currency crisis and halt on imports, including food and fuel, starving Afghan civilians whom the United States had promised to protect.
另一个问题是:是否释放阿富汗政府被冻结在美国的94亿美元的货币储备。将数十亿美元交给塔利班意味着为其极端保守的统治机制提供资金。但扣留这笔钱几乎肯定会导致货币危机的突发,以及食品和燃料等进口的暂停,使美国承诺保护的阿富汗平民挨饿。
These are only the beginning. Washington and the Taliban may spend years, even decades, pulled between cooperation and conflict, compromise and competition, as they manage a relationship in which neither can fully tolerate nor live without the other.
这些只是开始。华盛顿和塔利班可能会花费数年甚至数十年的时间在合作与冲突、妥协与竞争之间反复,因为他们要处理的是一种既不能完全容忍也不能没有对方的关系。
However fierce in battle, the Taliban seem to understand that governing an impoverished, war-ravaged nation is a very different challenge for which it needs economic and diplomatic support, both of which it is already seeking from the United States.
无论较量多么激烈,塔利班似乎都明白,治理一个饱受战争蹂躏的贫困国家是一个非常不同的挑战,它需要经济和外交支持,而这两者它都已在向美国寻求支持
Washington, for its part, sees Afghanistan as a potential haven for international terrorists, a center of geopolitical competition against its greatest adversaries and the site of two looming catastrophes — Taliban rule and economic collapse — that could each ripple far beyond the country’s borders.
就华盛顿而言,它认为阿富汗是国际恐怖分子的潜在避风港,是与最大对手进行地缘政治竞争的中心,这里将发生两起迫在眉睫的灾难——塔利班统治和经济崩溃,这些灾难的影响可能远远超出该国的边界。
At home, President Biden already faces a backlash over Afghanistan that would be likely to intensify if he were seen as enabling Taliban rule. But he may find that securing even the most modest American aims in the country requires tolerating the group that now controls it.
在国内,拜登总统因阿富汗问题已经面临强烈反对,如果他被视为支持塔利班统治,这种反对可能会加剧。但他可能会发现,即使是美国在该国实现最温和的目标,也需要容忍现在控制它的团体。
His administration got a taste of this new reality last week, when American forces evacuating Kabul relied on Taliban fighters to help secure the city’s airport.
上周,他的政府体验到了这一新现实,当时撤离喀布尔的美军依靠塔利班武装分子来帮助保护该市的机场。
上周,机场附近的塔利班武装分子。由于失去外国援助,该组织的领导人可能很快就会面临大范围的饥荒和其他问题。
上周,机场附近的塔利班武装分子。由于失去外国援助,该组织的领导人可能很快就会面临大范围的饥荒和其他问题。 JIM HUYLEBROEK FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES
“It’s in their interest that we are able to leave on time,” President Biden said when asked about the risks, and perhaps indignities, of welcoming partial Taliban control over access to the evacuation.
当拜登总统被问及欢迎塔利班部分控制撤离过程所带来的风险——甚至可能是羞辱——时,他说:“我们能够按时离开符合他们的利益。”
He added, in a line that may come to define the relationship, “It’s not a matter of trust, it’s a matter of mutual self-interest.”
他还说:“这不是信任问题,而是共同利益问题。”这句话也许会成为双方关系的定义。
Mutual Enemies
共同的敌人
If the United States, now without troops or allies in Afghanistan, wishes to contain ISIS-K, it will need on-the-ground intelligence and friendly forces.
美国目前在阿富汗没有军队或盟友,如果它想要遏制伊斯兰国呼罗珊分支,它需要实地情报和友军。
And the Taliban, still straining to consolidate control over the country’s many remote corners, may need American air power to help defeat the group.
而塔利班仍在努力巩固对阿富汗许多偏远角落的控制权,可能需要美国的空中力量来帮助击败该组织。
That combination was essential to beating the Islamic State in Iraq, officials who worked on the campaign have said. Washington and the Taliban are already testing quiet, mostly tacit coordination.
参与相关行动的官员表示,这种组合对于击败伊拉克境内的伊斯兰国至关重要。华盛顿和塔利班已经在悄悄进行大多心照不宣的协调行动测试
The United States has a long history of working with unsavory governments against terrorist groups.
美国与声名狼藉的政府合作打击恐怖组织的历史由来已久。
But such governments have routinely exploited this to win American acquiescence, and even assistance, in suppressing domestic opponents they have labeled extremists.
但这些政府经常利用这一点来赢得美国的默许,甚至援助,镇压他们称为极端分子的国内反对者。
This dynamic has long enabled dictators to disregard American demands on human rights and democracy, confident that Washington would tolerate their abuses as long as they delivered on terrorism matters.
这种态势长期以来使独裁者能够无视美国对人权和民主的要求,相信只要他们在恐怖主义问题上有所作为,华盛顿就会容忍他们的恶行。
伊斯兰国上周声称对喀布尔的两起爆炸负责,数十人死亡,其中包括13名美国军人。
伊斯兰国上周声称对喀布尔的两起爆炸负责,数十人死亡,其中包括13名美国军人。 JIM HUYLEBROEK FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES
Even if American officials could verify every target list, any airstrikes would be in service to a Taliban takeover it spent decades resisting. And each Taliban soldier spared from fighting ISIS-K could be redirected to suppressing less extreme opposition groups.
即使美国官员可以核实每一个目标清单,任何空袭都将是在为塔利班接管服务,而美国花了数十年的时间抵制它。而任何免于与伊斯兰国呼罗珊分支战斗的塔利班武装分子,都可以转而去镇压不那么极端的其他反对派组织
It may ultimately be a question of whether Washington prefers an Afghanistan divided by civil war — the very conditions that produced the Taliban and now ISIS-K — or one unified under the control of a Taliban that may or may not moderate itself in power.
最终的问题可能是,华盛顿是想要一个因内战而分裂的阿富汗——正是这种条件产生了塔利班和现在的伊斯兰国呼罗珊组织,还是在塔利班的控制下一个统一的阿富汗,而掌权的塔利班也许会节制自己的行为,也许不会。
A Diplomatic Dance
外交之舞
The Taliban, desperate for foreign support, have emphasized a desire to build ties with Washington.
迫切需要外国支持的塔利班强调了与华盛顿建立关系的愿望。
The longer the United States holds out recognition, formal or informal, the more incentive the Taliban have to chase American approval. But if Washington waits too long, other powers may fill the diplomatic vacuum first.
美国予以承认的希望越持久,无论是正式的还是非正式的,塔利班就越有动力寻求美国的认可。但如果华盛顿等得太久,其他大国可能会先填补外交真空。
Iran and China, which border Afghanistan, are both signaling that they may embrace the Taliban government in exchange for promises related mostly to terrorism. Both are eager to avoid an economic collapse or return to war on their borders. And they are especially eager to keep American influence from returning.
与阿富汗接壤的伊朗和中国都发出了信号,它们可能会承认塔利班政府,以换取主要与恐怖主义有关的承诺。两国都极力避免阿富汗出现经济崩溃或在边境重新爆发战争的情况。它们尤其渴望阻止美国的影响力回归。
“Beijing will want to extend recognition to the Taliban government, likely after or at the same time that Pakistan does so but before any Western country does,” Amanda Hsiao, a China analyst for the International Crisis Group, wrote in a recent policy brief.
国际危机研究组织(International Crisis Group)的中国分析师萧嫣然(Amanda Hsiao)在最近的一份政策简报中写道:“北京可能希望在巴基斯坦之后或同时承认塔利班政府,但要在任何西方国家承认之前。”
Iran has already begun referring to the “Islamic Emirate,” the Taliban’s preferred name for its government. Iranian missions remain open.
伊朗已经开始提及“伊斯兰酋长国”,这是塔利班对其政府的首选名称。伊朗驻阿富汗的外交机构一直开放。
For Washington, there are gray areas between embracing or isolating the Taliban. Friendly countries with interests in Afghanistan, such as Turkey or Qatar, are already hinting at a desire to keep up or even deepen business interests in the country, for which they are likely to seek at least tacit American approval.
对于华盛顿来说,接受和孤立塔利班之间存在灰色地带。土耳其和卡塔尔等与阿富汗有利益关系的友好国家已经暗示,希望保持甚至深化在该国的商业利益,为此它们可能至少会寻求美国的默许。
Washington did not recognize Vietnam’s government until 1995, 20 years after withdrawing. But the intervening years included a flurry of agreements. American concessions tended to strengthen Vietnamese pragmatists over hard-liners, bringing reciprocation.
华盛顿直到1995年才承认越南政府,也就是撤军20年后。但在这期间,双方达成了一系列协议。美国的让步倾向于增强越南实用主义派而非强硬派,从而带来回报。
Still, Vietnam remains a single-party dictatorship that has only very slowly and slightly eased. But the former enemies have drawn much closer over one issue that is not likely to apply in Afghanistan, extensive trade, and another that is — opposition to China.
尽管如此,越南仍然是一个一党专政的国家,只是缓慢而轻微地有所缓和。但这两个昔日的敌人在一个问题上走得更近了,即广泛的贸易,这一问题不太可能适用于阿富汗;还有另一个问题——反对中国。
Many Afghans fear that American recognition, even indirect, could be taken as a blank check for the group to rule however it wants.
许多阿富汗人担心,美国的承认,即使是间接的承认,也可能会被视为开给该组织的空白支票,让它可以任意统治。
Still, some who are fiercely opposed to both the Taliban and the American withdrawal have urged international engagement.
尽管如此,一些强烈反对塔利班和美国撤军的人还是敦促国际社会的参与。
“Everyone with a stake in the stability of Afghanistan needs to come together,” Saad Mohseni, an Afghan-Australian businessmen behind much of the country’s media sector, wrote in a Financial Times essay.
“与阿富汗的稳定息息相关的人需要团结起来,”阿富汗裔澳大利亚商人、阿富汗媒体大佬萨阿德·穆赫塞尼(Saad Mohseni)在英国《金融时报》(Financial Times)发表的文章中写道
塔利班已明确表示希望与华盛顿建立关系,但拜登总统的任何让步都可能涉及痛苦的政治选择。
塔利班已明确表示希望与华盛顿建立关系,但拜登总统的任何让步都可能涉及痛苦的政治选择。 STEFANI REYNOLDS FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES
Rather than undermine the Taliban government, he urged, foreign powers including the United States “must leverage this need for recognition and persuade the Taliban to adopt a more accommodating stance.”
他敦促包括美国在内的外国势力不要破坏塔利班政府,“必须利用这种承认的需要,说服塔利班采取更加宽容的立场。”
Neither engagement nor hostility is likely to transform the group’s underlying nature. And even when engagement works, it can be slow and frustrating, with many breakdowns and reversals on a road to rapprochement that might take decades to travel.
无论是接触还是敌对,都不可能改变该集团的根本性质。即使接触起到了作用,也可能是缓慢和令人沮丧的,在通往和解的道路上,可能需要数十年的时间,期间会出现许多破裂和倒退。
The Other Looming Catastrophe
另一个迫在眉睫的大灾难
Perhaps the only scenario as dire as a Taliban takeover is one that is all but assured without American intervention: economic collapse, even famine.
也许唯一与塔利班接管政权同样可怕的情况是经济崩溃,甚至是饥荒,在没有美国干预的情况下,这种事几乎可以肯定会发生。
Afghanistan imports much of its food and fuel, and most of its electricity. Because it runs a deep trade deficit, it pays for imports mostly through foreign aid, which amounts to nearly half of the country’s economy — and has now been suspended.
阿富汗的大部分食物、燃料和电力都是进口的。由于存在严重贸易赤字,它主要通过外援支付进口费用,而外援几乎占到该国经济的一半,现在已经暂停。
The country holds enough currency reserves to finance about 18 months of imports. Or it did, until the U.S. froze the accounts.
该国的外汇储备可以为大约18个月的进口提供资金。或者说,直到美国冻结这些账户之前是这样。
As a result, Afghanistan may soon run out of food and fuel with no way to replenish either.
结果是,阿富汗的食物和燃料可能很快就会耗尽,而且没有办法补充。
“Acute famines generally result from shortages of food triggering a scramble for necessities, speculation and spikes in food prices, which kill the poorest,” a Columbia University economist, Adam Tooze, wrote last week. “Those are the elements we can already see at work in Afghanistan.”
“严重的饥荒通常是由食物短缺引发对必需品的争夺、投机和食品价格飙升造成的,这些都会导致最贫穷的人死亡。”哥伦比亚大学(Columbia University)经济学家亚当·图兹(Adam Tooze)上周写道。 “我们已经可以看到这些因素在阿富汗发生作用。”
As the United States learned in 1990s Somalia, flying in food does not solve the problem and may even worsen it by putting local farmers out of business.
1990年代,美国在索马里学到,空运粮食并不能解决问题,甚至可能会使当地农民失业,令局势进一步恶化。
Mr. Tooze warned of what economists call a “sudden stop,” in which countries suddenly lose the ability to finance their trade deficit. This can also trigger a currency crisis, leading to runaway inflation that makes whatever food is left all but unaffordable.
图兹警告,会出现经济学家所说的“突然停止”,即国家突然失去为其贸易赤字融资的能力。这还可能引发货币危机,导致通货膨胀失控,食物即使有售,也几乎贵到无法负担。
本月喀布尔的水果摊贩。阿富汗的大部分食物和燃料以及大部分电力都需要进口,但支付这些必需品的钱即将耗尽。
本月喀布尔的水果摊贩。阿富汗的大部分食物和燃料以及大部分电力都需要进口,但支付这些必需品的钱即将耗尽。 VICTOR J. BLUE FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES
In the northern Afghan city of Kunduz, flour prices have already risen by 41 percent and gas prices by 63 percent, according to Save the Children, a charity. The group also surveyed some of the thousands of families displaced from rural areas to Kabul and found that many already lack the means to buy food.
根据慈善机构救助儿童会(Save the Children)的数据,在阿富汗北部城市昆都士,面粉价格已经上涨了41%,汽油价格上涨了63%。该组织还调查了数千个从农村地区流离失所到喀布尔的家庭,发现许多家庭已经没有办法购买食物。
Political Costs
政治成本
It is difficult to imagine a harder sell in Washington than offering diplomatic outreach and billions of dollars to the group that once harbored Al Qaeda, barred women from public life and staged public executions.
在华盛顿,很难想象还有什么比向这个曾经庇护基地组织、禁止女性参与公共生活,并实施公开处决的组织提供外交联系和数十亿美元更难以让人接受的了。
Republicans are already seizing on the chaos of the withdrawal to criticize Mr. Biden as soft on adversaries abroad.
共和党人已抓住撤军带来的混乱,批评拜登对海外对手过于软弱。
He may also face pressure from Afghan émigrés, a number of whom already live in the United States. Diasporas, like those from Vietnam or Cuba, tend to be vocally hawkish toward the governments they fled.
拜登还可能面临来自阿富汗移民的压力,其中一些人已经居住在美国。和那些来自越南或古巴的侨民一样,他们往往会对他们所逃离的政府公开表示强硬态度
The administration, which is pursuing an ambitious domestic agenda in a narrowly divided Congress, may be hesitant to divert more political capital to a country that it sees as peripheral.
政府正在近乎分裂的国会推行雄心勃勃的国内议程,对于是否将更多政治资本转移到一个被其视为边缘国家的地方感到犹豫不决。
Still, Mr. Biden has seemed to relish rejecting political pressure on Afghanistan. Whether he chooses to privilege geopolitical rivalry, humanitarian welfare or counterterrorism in Afghanistan, he may find himself doing so again.
不过,拜登似乎希望拒绝对阿富汗施加政治压力。无论他选择把地缘政治竞争、人道主义福利还是阿富汗的反恐放在首位,他都可能会再次这么做。

Max Fisher是一名驻纽约的国际新闻记者和专栏作家,曾在世界各地报道冲突、外交、社会变革和其他主题。他撰写的“解析”专栏探讨重大世界事件背后的想法和背景。欢迎在TwitterFacebook上关注他。

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